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WAREHOUSE REGULATION SINCE MUNN v. ILLINOIS
J. R. Blomquist*
O VER EIGHTY YEARS ago, midwestern farmers were driven
into organized revolt against their almost complete depend-
ence upon outside markets for the disposal of their produce
and upon corporately owned elevators and railroads for its han-
dling. Rates as high as fifty-eight and one-half cents per bushel
for the shipping of grain from the Mississippi basin to the At-
lantic seaboard, and nearly half as much for the short haul from
an Iowa farm to Chicago, brought about rumblings which were
heard in the midwestern legislative halls in 1869 as well as in
the Illinois Constitutional Convention held during that same
period. Those farmers who had bound themselves together in a
lodge known as the Patrons of Husbandry, and a host of un-
affiliated farmers' clubs, asserted new-found political power while
they exhorted their neighbors to elect only those who shared in
the view that nothing less than state regulation of railroads and
elevators could rid them of the stifling practices of those enter-
prises.1
The success of the Granger Movement was first felt by the
warehouse operators when the framers of the Illinois Constitution
of 1870 embraced the cause of the grain shippers and inserted in
that document a provision denoting grain elevators and store-
houses as public warehouses, and directing the General Assem.
bly to pass laws for the protection of producers, shippers, and re-
ceivers of grain.2 In the following year, a comprehensive body
* A. B., LL. B. Member, Illinois bar. Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent
College of Law.
1 See Buck, The Granger Movement (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1933,
being a reprint of the 1913 edition).
2 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. XIV. The Illinois Supreme Court, In Hannah v. People,
198 Ill. 77 at 82, 64 N. E. 776 at 777 (1902), adverted to the fact that "the framers
of the Constitution deemed the matter of protection of producers and shippers of
grain against wrong, fraud, and imposition on the part of those engaged in the
business of providing storage for grain of great importance is demonstrated .by the
fact that they devoted an entire article of the Constitution to that subject." That
the framers included such material at all would seem sufficient evidence of the
importance they attached to the matter, inasmuch as no other state constitution
touches on the subject of warehousing.
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of regulation was enacted by the Illinois legislature pursuant to
this directive.3 Maximum rates for grain storage were established
and operators of public warehouses were required to obtain
licenses and to post bonds. Believing they were engaged in a
private business not subject to such regulation, two Chicago ele-
vator operators continued to charge the same storage rates as
they had previously done, rates which were in excess of the new
maximum imposed by the statute. The Supreme Court of the
United States was thereby led to decide the case of Munn v. Illi-
nois4 and to make its first significant pronouncement on the public
utility concept.
That the pricing practices of grain storage companies to-
gether with the concentrated control of the business in Chicago
influenced the court to uphold the Illinois enactment cannot be
doubted. Warehouses, the court said, stood "at the very gate-
way of commerce to take toll from all who passed," 5 for which
reason anyone who devoted his property to such a use in effect
granted "to the public an interest in that use, and must submit
to be controlled by the public for the common good."', Oddly
enough, these familiar words taken from the opinion in Munn v.
Illinois, although spoken with reference to the operation of grain
warehouses, have rarely been mentioned since in relation to that
activity. Based on an almost forgotten work written two centuries
earlier by Chief Justice Hale,7 the doctrine of property affected
with a public interest had never been applied to a statute like
this one, but the words became a formula. Warehouses, however,
were forgotten except insofar as the warehousing activity had
been the incidental vehicle for an important decision. Regulation
of warehouses by state legislatures, though, was to continue and
to be expanded on all sides for seventy years.
The words of the Supreme Court relating to the suscepti-
3 Ill. Laws 1871-2, p. 762, Act of April 25, 1871. The statute presently appears in
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 114, §§ 189-214.
4 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77 (1877).
5 94 U. S. 113 at 132, 24 L. Ed. 77 at 86.
6 94 U. S. 113 at 126, 24 L. Ed. 77 at 84.
7 De Portibus Maris, 1 Harg. L. Tr. 78.
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bility of warehouses to governmental control have proved sur-
prisingly durable in the seventy-three years since they were
spoken. Few voices have risen to challenge the wisdom of Jus-
tice Waite in the interim, despite a lusty prediction at the time
that Munn v. Illinois would toll the death knell for unregulated
individual enterprise in the United States." It is, therefore, not
surprising that the next important occasion on which warehouse
regulation was brought into focus by the Supreme Court resulted
from another conflict based upon other constitutional considera-
tions. Accepting the premise that they must submit to regulation,
the warehouse operators turned their attention to the matter of
identifying the tormenter, realizing that they might gain if they
were free to ignore oppressive state regulation while complying
with federal enactments on the subject.
Although warehouse acts were conceived by state legislatures,
the court deciding Munm, v. Illinois had not ignored the relation of
elevators to interstate commerce. Indeed, it recognized the pos-
sibility that Congress might institute a system of controls when
it said:
The warehouses of these plaintiffs in error are situated and
their businesses carried on exclusively in Illinois. They are
used as instruments by those engaged in State as well as those
engaged in interstate commerce, but they are not more neces-
sarily a part of commerce itself than the dray or the car by
which, but for them, grain would not be transferred from
one railroad station to another. Incidentally they may be-
come connected with interstate commerce, but not necessarily
so. Their regulation is a thing of domestic concern, and cer-
tainly, until Congress acts in reference to their interstate
relations, the State may exercise all the powers of govern-
ment over them, even though in so doing it may indirectly
operate upon commerce outside its immediate jurisdiction. 9
SThe august New York Times called the doctrine of Munn v. Illinois "mis-
chievous," "meddlesome," and "vexatious." See Clemens, Economics and Public
Utilities (Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1950), p. 16.
9 94 U. S. 113 at 135, 24 L. Ed. 77 at 87.
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But Congress, apparently, was not then ready to take up the sub-
ject of regulating interstate commerce, not at least so far as reg-
ulating grain warehousing was concerned.
With the impetus provided by the decision in Muwn v. Illinois,
the states got down to serious business. Many of the midwestern
and northwestern states, where the Granger Movement had flour-
ished and where the abuses by elevator operators had been felt
most acutely, adopted legislation patterned, in varying degree,
on the Illinois Warehouse Act.10 By 1914, some fifteen states re-
quired a license for all who engaged in the activities of a public
grain warehouse." Seven states allowed the fixing of rates for
the storage of grain,12 and others applied like regulation to the
storage of cotton and tobacco. 13  Six states fixed maximum stor-
age rates.'4 In addition to the matters mentioned, many statutes
included provisions relating to inspection, weighing, rendering
reports, grading, discrimination, and the like. 15  Those states
which passed up the opportunity to enact such statutes were, by
and large, those which had no extensive grain elevator business
within their bounds.
The jurisdiction of states to exercise police powers in this
fashion remained unchallenged by Congress for many years and,
seemingly, all were content to leave the matter in the hands of
10 See Mohun, Warehousemen (Nickerson & Collins Co., Chicago, 1914).
11Ala. Code 1907, § 6124; Ida. Rev. Code 1908, § 1482d; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1916, Ch.
114, § 136; Kan. Gen. Stat. 1909, § 3346; Ky. Stat. 1909, § 4782; Mass. Rev. Laws
1902, Ch. 69, § 1; Minn. Rev. Laws 1905, § 2048; Mo. Rev. Stat. 1909, § 11947;
Mont. Laws 1913, Ch. 47, § 19; N. D. Laws 1913, Ch. 239, p. 383; Okla. Rev. Laws
1910, § 8248: Ore. Laws 1910, § 6043; S. D. Rev. Code 1903, § 484; Pierce's Wash.
Code 1912, Tit. 211, § 18; Wis. Stat. 1911, § 1747-1.
12 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1912, Ch. 114, § 147: Kan. Gen. Stat. 1909, § 3360; Mo. Laws
1913, p. 354, § 27; N. Y. Cons. Laws 1909, Vol. 2, Gen. Bus. Law, Ch. 20, Art. 26,
§ 396; N. D. Rev. Code 1905, § 2252; Okla. Rev. Laws 1910, § 8266; Wis. Stat. 1911,
§ 1747-18.
15 The South Carolina Code 1912, § 2332, dealt with cotton. Ohio Gen. Code 1910,
§ 6058; Tenn. Acts 1909, § 3399; and Pollard Va. Code 1904, § 1821, regulated tobacco
storage.
14 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1912, Ch. 114, § 147; Minn. Rev. Laws 1909, § 2057; Mo. Laws
1913, p. 354, § 27; Mont. Laws 1913, § 33; N. Y. Cons. Laws 1909, Vol. 2, Gen. Bus.
Law, Ch. 20, Art. 26, § 396; Okla. Rev. Laws 1910, § 8266.
15 The statutes referred to in notes 11 to 14 inclusive are those which achieve
regulation relating specifically to warehouses. Other statutes, where regulation may
be accomplished under powers granted over public utilities generally, are not
Included in the tabulation.
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state agencies for the evils sought to be curbed were felt mostly
at the local level. However, no one questioned the power of Con-
gress to act with reference to the interstate relations of the ware-
housing business'1 and, in 1916, with the enactment of the United
States Warehouse Act, 17 Congress asserted that power. That
statute authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to license grain
warehouse operators, to investigate weighing procedures, to in-
spect elevators, to require bonds of licensees, to prohibit discrimi-
nation, to require standardized reports of licensees, and to impose
other miscellaneous restrictions on the freedom of operators.
Three features of this action were significant. In the first
place, the act did not require a license of any operator whose op-
erations affected interstate commerce, but only permitted the
licensing of those operators interested enough to make application
for the same and who were willing to comply with the act and the
regulations imposed thereunder.' Secondly, as originally en-
acted, the statute set the record straight with regard to the status
of existing state laws by declaring that nothing "in this Chapter
shall be construed to conflict with or to authorize any conflict
with, or in any way impair the effect of operations of the laws of
any state relating to warehouses, warehousemen, weighers, grad-
ers, or classifiers. "'9 Thus it is apparent that state regulation of
warehouses had become so important a part of the economic and
political fabric that Congress was especially careful not to up-
root the extensive network of state controls which had been ef-
fectively established following the decision in the Munn case. A
third factor, useful in evaluating the United States Warehouse
Act, is to be found in the purpose of the legislation, for that pur-
16 In U. S. v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 at 118, 61 S. Ct. 451 at 459, 85 L. Ed. 609 at
619 (1940), the court declared that "power of Congress over interstate commerce
is not confined to the regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those
activities which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of
Congress over it as to make regulation of them an appropriate means to the attain-
ment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted powers of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce."
17 39 Stat. 486, Ch. 313, part C, as amended: 7 U. S. C. A. § 241 et seq., 2 Fed.
Code Anno., Tit. 7, § 241 et seq.
'8 7 U. S. C. A. § 244.
19 Ibid., § 269.
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pose appeared to be one to provide a glorified warehouse re-
ceipts law, written with the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act in
mind. It was designed to enhance the value of grain and similar
receipts for collateral purposes by assuring bankers and credit
men that grain which had been stored in a federally licensed ware-
house would be subject to added controls planned for their
protection.20  It would seem clear, as has been stated, that Con-
gress did not undertake any general affirmative regulation of ware-
houses even remotely comparable to the scope of regulation it
has provided for other public utilities.
Co-existing state and federal control seemed to be sanctioned
both by the United States Warehouse Act and by federal court
decisions for a considerable period of time following 1916. It
was held by the Circuit Court of Appeals, in Independent Gin
& Warehouse Company v. Dunwoody, 2 1 that Congress did not
intend to occupy the whole field of law in relation to the storage
of agricultural products moving in interstate commerce, so as to
exclude the jurisdiction of the states, even though such regula-
tion should tend to affect interstate commerce, for an Alabama
statute which required a license of a cotton warehouseman was
there upheld. The Supreme Court itself stated that the purpose
of the federal act was not to supersede state law but was in-
tended to provide a form of co-operation with state officials in the
control of the activity.22 In a few years, therefore, twenty-one
states had laws requiring licenses of all public warehousemen, 23
and five others had laws with exacted similar compliance from
20 See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218 at 242, 67 S. Ct. 1146 at 1158, 91 L. Ed. 1447 at 1465
(1946).
2140 F. (2d) 1 (1930).
22 See Merchants Exchange v. Missouri, 248 U. S. 365, 39 S. Ct. 114, 63 L. Ed. 300
(1919).
23 Ida. Code 1947, Tit. 69, § 2; Ii. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 114, §§ 189-214;
Burn's Ind. Stat. Anno. 1933, Tit. 67, Ch. 5; Kan. Gen. Stat. Anno. 1935, Ch. 34,
Art. 2; Ky. Rev. Stat. 1948, Ch. 359; La. Gen. Stat. 1935, Tit. 68, Ch. 1; Mass.
Anno. Laws, 1948 Supp., Ch. 105; Mich. Stat. Anno., 1949 Supp., §§ 12.119(1)-
12.119(22) ; Minn. Stat. 1949, Ch. 231, 232 and 233; Mo. Rev. Stat. Anno., Ch. 141;
Mont. Rev. Code Anno. 1947, § 3-201 to § 3-232; Neb. Rev. Stat. 1943, § 88-201 to
§ 88-215; N. H. Rev. Laws, 1942, Ch. 205; N. Al. Stat. Anno. 1941, § 53-901 to § 53-911;
N. D. Rev. Code 1943, Tit. 60; Okla. Stat. Anno. 1938, Tit. 81; Ore. Comp. Laws
Anno. 1940, § 60-101 to § 60-113; S. D. Code 1939, Ch. 60.03; S. C. Code 1942, § 7176;
Wash. Rev. Stat. Anno. 1933, Tit. 83; Wis. Stat. 1949, Ch. 126.
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operators of cotton, tobacco, or cold storage warehouses. 2 In
four additional states, warehousemen could obtain a license if
they wished to do so. 2 5 The number of states controlling storage
rates under warehouse acts had increased to eleven, 26 while a
number of others exercised the same regulation under powers
granted over public utilities generally. Some state statutes con-
tained clauses exempting operators from state regulation if they
had secured a license under the federal Warehouse Act.27  But
the complexity of state enactments ranged from extensive regu-
lation of all phases of the pursuit, on the one hand,2 8 to toothless
acts having to do with little more than fire prevention on the other.
Such diversity in types of control could lead to but one result.
Once more the cry was heard that credit transactions were being
endangered by such a state of affairs. Bankers admitted that
they were unable to keep pace with the laws of forty-eight states,
hence were unable properly to estimate the security value of the
warehouse receipts with which they dealt.2 9  At their insistence,
in 1931, Section 269 of the United States Warehouse Act was
amended and language was used which made it unmistakable that
the intent of Congress was to substitute the federal system for
those which had been developed under the various state statutes 0
It is difficult to estimate with what degree of enthusiasm state
agencies enforced their local controls after the amendment of
24 Ariz. Code Anno. 1939, § 52-903, applies to cotton and wool storage; Ark. Stat.
Anno. 1947, Tit. 77, Ch. 13, deals with co-operatives; Page's Ohio Gen. Code 1945,
§ 6043, and Tenn. Code Anno. 1942, §§ 6477-8, cover tobacco warehousing; while Va.
Code Anno. 1950, Tit. 61-80, regulates cold storage.
25 Deering Cal. Code Anno. 1950, Agriculture, Div. 6, Oh. 5: Ga. Code Anno. 1937.
Tit. 111; Iowa Code Anno. 1949, Ch. 543; N. C. Gen. Stat. 1950, § 66-35
26 To the statutes mentioned in note 14, ante, there should be added statutes
enacted in Arkansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, an(d
Wisconsin. Citations thereto appear in notes 23 and 24, ante.
27 See, for example, the statutes of Arizona, Idaho, Michigan, New Mexico. and
Oklahoma referred to in notes 23 and 24, ante.
28 Examples of comprehensive regulation may be found in the Minnesota,
Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota statutes cited in note 23, ante.
29 See Sen. Rep. No. 1775, 71st Cong., 3d sess., p. 2; H. R. Rep. No. 4, 71st Cong.,
1st sess., and 72 Cong. Rec. 8529.
30 46 Stat. 1465, 7 U. S. C. A. § 269, omitted the clause quoted in the text at
footnote 19, ante, and added "but the power, jurisdiction, and authority conferred
upon the Secretary of Agriculture under this Chapter shall be exclusive with respect
to all persons securing a license hereunder so long as said license is in effect."
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Section 269. Some indication is to be found, in the few reported
cases decided since then, that warehouse operators ignored state
regulations when they chose to obtain a federal license. One
Illinois company, for example, owning twenty of the forty-one
elevators in Chicago and storing approximately 35,000,000 bushels
out of the total capacity of 47,757,000 bushels, licensed twelve of
its warehouses under the federal act but only three under the
Illinois statute, the remaining five not being public warehousesA1
The Supreme Court of South Dakota seemed to feel that state
control had been displaced entirely by the federal act which
granted discretionary power to the Secretary of Agriculture to
exercise exclusive federal control without co-operation with the
states. 3 2 When a defendant failed to secure a state license, but
did possess a federal one, the South Dakota court met the head-on
collision by holding that the state must bow out and defer to the
United States Warehouse Act.
3
It might be said to be appropriate, or ironic, that the show-
down in the argument of state in contrast to federal regulation
of grain warehouses should have its situs in the same state, and
concern substantially the same warehouse act, which had been in-
volved in Munn v. Illinois. The Granger Movement had long since
been forgotten, but the threat of oppressive practices by unregu-
lated, or inadequately regulated, terminal grain elevator opera-
tors must have been in the mind of the petitioner, an owner,
dealer, and shipper of grain, when, in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corporation,3 4 he charged the elevator corporation with maintain-
31 Edward R. Bacon Grain Co. v. City of Chicago, 325 Ill. App. 245, 59 N. E. (2d)
689 (1945).
32 In re Farmers Co-op Ass'n, 69 S. D. 191, 8 N. W. (2d) 557 (1943).
3369 S. D. 191 at 199, 8 N. W. (2d) 557 at 561. The court held that it was
necessary to look to the impact, on the national economy, of the country elevator
business as a whole in determining whether its effect on interstate commerce was
substantial. The fact that the particular co-operative elevator's own effect was
trivial was not enough to remove it from the rule since the contribution of the
entire industry would be great. This theory was discussed in Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U. S. 111, 63 S. Ct. 82, 87 L. Ed. 122 (1922). See also Federal Compress Co.
v. McClean, 291 U. S. 17, 54 S. Ct. 267, 78 L. Ed. 622 (1933), a case holding that a
non-discriminatory state tax on warehouses was not prohibited by the United States
Warehouse Act since that statute had not assumed to tax the business nor had
exercised any control over state taxation.
34331 U. S. 218, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 91 L. Ed. 1447 (1946), affirming 156 F. (2d) 33
(1946), in part. Frankfurter, J., with whom Rutledge, J., concurred, wrote a dis-
senting opinion.
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ing excessive rates, engaging in discriminatory practices, operat-
ing without a state license, rendering inadequate service, mixing
public grain of different grades, as well as perpetrating other
violations of the Illinois Warehouse Act. The corporation sought
to enjoin further proceedings on the basis that the right of the
State of Illinois to enforce its regulations had been superseded
by the federal act. The Supreme Court of the United States, on
certiorari, affirmed the warehouseman's position and granted the
injunction, with the result that the shipper was unable to have his
remedy for the alleged violations of the state law.
By that decision, state regulation has now been foreclosed
where the warehouseman has elected to obtain a federal license,
at least as to those matters which are "in any way regulated by
the federal act," and dual regulation has been eliminated. For
those operators who do not choose to secure a federal license,
and in those aspects of warehousing which the federal act does
not "touch," however meagerly and indirectly, state law may con-
tinue in force. However, the areas so retained for control by the
states appear to be of negligible importance.
In the Rice case, for example, nine aspects of regulation by
both agencies were compared. Under the Illinois statute, public
utility rates must be just and reasonable and the state commission
may fix rates which meet that standard, 5 and maximum storage
charges are set by statute .3  The federal act, in contrast, per-
mits the revocation or suspension of a license if it appears that
rates are "unreasonable or exorbitant," but does not permit of
rate-fixing nor provide adequate sanction against the charging of
excessive rates. 37 Discrimination between persons applying for
the use of facilities is forbidden by both actsA8 The Illinois law
prohibits the operator from acting in a dual position by storing
his own grain while doing the same thing for the public, 39 but
35 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 1112, §§ 32, 36 and 41.
36 Ibid., Ch. 114, § 202.
37 Contrast 7 U. S. C. A. § 246, and the regulations appearing in 7 C. F. R. 102.9,
with the statute cited in note 35, ante.
38 Compare 7 U. S. C. A. § 254, with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 114, § 202.
39 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. XIV. See also Hannah v. People, 198 111. 77, 64 N. E. 776
(1902).
WAREHOUSE REGULATION
the federal act requires only that receipts issued for such grain
must disclose the true relationship when an operator stores his
own grain.40 The mixing of grain of different grades is regulated
by both acts, as is the practice of sacrificing or rebating storage
charges. 1 Extensive regulation of inadequate, inefficient and
unsafe facilities is provided for under both acts. 2 Operation
without a state license is, of course, forbidden in Illinois, 43 but
no federal license is compulsory. 4 Abandonment of warehouse
service is possible, under the state law, only with commission ap-
proval,45 but is spoken of only with reference to "termination"
in the federal act, one ground for which is "ceasing to do busi-
ness. "6 The filing and publishing of rate schedules have been sub-
jected to control under both.
4 7
By the test previously stated, each of the nine matters out-
lined was held, by the Rice case, to be beyond the reach of the
Illinois Commerce Commission, since Congress had declared a pol-
icy on each of the subjects in the federal Warehouse Act. Yet,
the court has not held that an elevator operator is altogether
acquitted of responsibility to state law for he must still conform
to matters of regulation imposed by the state which are not touched
by Congress. State regulation, however, is prohibited as to all
matters "touched," even though lightly, by federal law, for the
prohibition is not limited to those subjects where there is direct
conflict or where there is a precise concurrence in control.48 The
Rice case, then, leaves a little power in the state while serving
to wipe out a great deal of the power formerly enjoyed.
40 7 U. S. C. A. § 250(i).
41 The Illinois restriction appears in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 114, § 204.
The federal view is set out In 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 256, 258 and 262, and in 7 C. F. R.
102.50.
42 Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 111%, §§ 32, 49 and 50, with 7 U. S.
C. A. § 243, and with 7 C. F. R. §§ 102.7 and 102.47.
43 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 114, § 191.
44 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 243-5; 7 C. F. R. §§ 102.3-102.12.
45 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 111-,.(, § 49a.
46 7 U. S. C. A. § 246; 7 C. F. R. § 102.9.
47 The state provisions are set out in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 111%, §§ 33
and 35. For the federal stipulations, see 7 C. F. R. § 102.5.
48 That position was advanced by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opin-
ion in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218 at 2.38, 67 S. Ct. 1146 at 115ti,
91 L. Ed. 1447 at 1463 (1946).
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The legislative history of the state and federal acts indi-
cates that there existed two distinct purposes to be subserved in
the regulation of grain warehouses. The primary objective of
federal regulation has been to enhance and stabilize the value of
warehouse receipts for use as collateral in financial transactions.
The states, by contrast, have intended their acts as a means by
which to protect the producer and the public from abuses by
warehousemen who occupy a strategic position in the flow of grain
from producer to consumer. Notwithstanding this variation in
purpose, Congress and the Supreme Court have now wiped out
a goodly portion of the accumulation of state legislation which
had been permitted to flourish in the train of Munn v. Illinois.
Advocates of uniformity might well seek to justify the more
recent development. But the cold truth is that the United States
Warehouse Act was not designed to accomplish, nor is it capable,
without implementation, of serving, those ends sought by the
states. While Congress has "touched" upon certain subjects to
the exclusion of the states, it has not seen fit to provide adequate
enforcement provisions, nor has it developed an agency equipped
with either manpower, funds, or the will to enforce its policies.
The abuses which the petitioner in the Rice case complained about
probably still persist, the operators having withdrawn to the pro-
tection of uniform non-regulation by the Secretary of Agricul-
ture through the simple and convenient expedient of obtaining a
federal license. It is true that there is a residue of control left
in the states, but the possibility of using such power in an effec-
tive manner is absent because of the withdrawal of all the im-
portant means by which state law could achieve effective control" 9
49 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 91 L. Ed. 1447
(1946), also involved three regulatory measures imposed by the Illinois statute
designed to prevent an unwarranted drain on utility funds and the creation of
unsound financial structures. These provisions required commission approval of all
contracts between the utility and its "affiliates," of contracts between the utility
and other public utilities, and for the issuance of certain securities. See Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 111/, §§ 8(a) (3), 21 and 27. It was held that Congress had
not excluded state action on these matters since no provision of the United States
Warehouse Act related to these subjects. The problem of determining whether other
specific state provisions may be valid or not is simply one of examination to see if
the federal act, or the regulations thereunder, have touched on the particular
subject.
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An overworked Secretary of Agriculture has found himself
handed the job of regulating grain warehouses in all major par-
ticulars by an amendment designed to bring about one thing, that
is the strengthening of warehouse receipts. Laissez faire has
been introduced outside the scope of his very narrow powers. As
things now stand, any energetic effort to regulate must be made
by the federal government, since an attempt by the state to do
so will merely force the operator into the arms of the federal
licensing agency and out of the reach of the state. The fact re-
mains, however, that history shows that at no time has Congress
deemed it advisable to introduce compulsory uniformity. The
obvious suggestion, therefore, is that Congress should repeal the
federal law, so as to reinstate local regulation, or provide for an
adequately manned and financially able federal agency to take over
active enforcement of a law comparable to the ones of which
the states have been deprived.
Until that happens, there is not much left for the states to do
in the limited opportunities for regulation left to them. It might
be wise for the states to avoid conflict entirely by exempting fed-
eral licensees from all applications of state law, as has been done
in Idaho, New Mexico and Oklahoma. In the four and one-half
years since the Rice case was decided, however, no state has made
any effort to revise its warehousing laws in the light of that de-
cision. This may be an indication that the need for state regu-
lation has diminished or ceased to exist. Perhaps warehouse regu-
lation has shifted into another phase. But whether or not times
have changed as much as the Rice case would imply will be known
when, and if, the voices of dissatisfaction heard prior to Munn v.
Illinois are again raised against the prevailing system of non-
regulation of the warehousing business.
